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We investigate whether bank performance during the credit crisis of 2008 is related to CEO incentives
and share ownership before the crisis and whether CEOs reduced their equity stakes in their banks
in anticipation of the crisis. There is no evidence that banks with CEOs whose incentives were better
aligned with the interests of their shareholders performed better during the crisis and some evidence
that these banks actually performed worse both in terms of stock returns and in terms of accounting
return on equity. Further, option compensation did not have an adverse impact on bank performance
during the crisis. Bank CEOs did not reduce their holdings of shares in anticipation of the crisis or
during the crisis; further, there is no evidence that they hedged their equity exposure. Consequently,
they suffered extremely large wealth losses as a result of the crisis.
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In the search of explanations for the dramatic collapse of the stock market capitalization of 
much of the banking industry in the U.S. during the credit crisis, one prominent argument is that 
executives at banks had poor incentives. For instance, Blinder argues that these poor incentives are 
“one  of  [the]  most  fundamental  causes”  of  the  credit  crisis.
1  The  argument  seems  to  be  that 
executives’ compensation was not properly related to long-term performance, leading the Obama 
administration to discuss ways to change compensation practices “to more closely align pay with 
long-term performance”
2 and to give more voice to shareholders through the adoption of “say on 
pay” for firms that received public funds through the Troubled Asset Relief Program.
3  
We investigate in this paper how closely the interests of the CEOs of banks were aligned with 
those of their shareholders before the start of the crisis, whether the alignment of interests between 
CEOs and shareholders can explain the performance of banks in the cross-section during the credit 
crisis,  and  how  CEOs  fared  during  the  crisis.  Traditionally,  corporate  governance  experts  and 
economists since Adam Smith have considered that management’s interests are better aligned with 
those of shareholders when managers’ compensation increases when shareholders gain and falls 
when  shareholders  lose.  Our  results  show  that  there  is  no  evidence  that  banks  with  a  better 
alignment of CEOs’ interests with those of their shareholders had higher stock returns during the 
crisis and some evidence that banks led by CEOs whose interests were better aligned with those of 
their shareholders had worse stock returns and a worse return on equity. Though options have been 
blamed  for  leading  to  excessive  risk-taking,  there  is  no  evidence  in  our  sample  that  greater 
sensitivity of CEO pay to stock volatility led to worse stock returns during the credit crisis. A 
plausible explanation for these findings is that CEOs focused on the interests of their shareholders 
in the build-up to the crisis and took actions that they believed the market would welcome. Ex post, 
                                                 
1 “Crazy compensation and the crisis,” by Alan Blinder, The Wall Street Journal, May 28, 2009. 
2 “U.S. eyes bank pay overhaul: Administration in early talks on ways to curb compensation across finance,” 
The Wall Street Journal, May 13, 2009. 
3 “U.S. targets excessive pay for top executives,” by David Cho, Zachary A. Goldfarb and Tomoeh 
Murakami Tse, The Washington Post, June 11, 2009; “US SEC proposes say on pay for TARP companies,” 
by James Pehtokoukis, Reuters, July 1, 2009.    2
these actions were costly to their banks and to themselves when the results turned out to be poor. 
These poor results were not expected by the CEOs to the extent that they did not reduce or hedge 
their holdings of shares in anticipation of poor outcomes.   
There are many versions of the poor incentives explanation of the crisis. One version is that 
CEOs  were  focused  on  the  short  run  rather  than  the  long  run.  Another  version  is  that option 
compensation  gave  incentives  to  CEOs  to  take  more  risks  than  would  have  been  optimal  for 
shareholders. A third version is that the high leverage of financial institutions implies that CEOs 
can increase the value of their shares by increasing the volatility of the assets since the shares are 
effectively options on the value of the assets.
4 To the extent that the market for a bank’s stock is 
efficient, changes in a bank’s long-term performance will be properly reflected in the stock price, 
so that greater sensitivity of a CEO’s wealth to his bank’s stock price will make it advantageous for 
the CEO to improve his bank’s long-term performance when it makes economic sense to do so. 
Focusing on the short run rather than the long run would be costly for CEOs since their stock price 
would be lower than if they took actions to maximize shareholder wealth. The incentive effects of 
options would be diluted in the CEO’s portfolio if he has large holdings of shares. Keeping the 
CEO’s holdings of his firm’s stock constant, greater sensitivity of his wealth to increases in the 
volatility of his firm’s stock return brought about by greater stock option holdings would increase 
the CEO’s incentives to take risks as long as these options are not too much in the money. Whether 
greater sensitivity of CEO wealth to volatility makes the CEO’s interests better aligned with the 
interests of shareholders would seem to depend on many considerations. For example, if the CEO’s 
holdings of stock make him more conservative, greater sensitivity of his wealth to volatility would 
help in aligning the CEO’s incentives with those of shareholders.   
CEOs with greater incentive alignment would therefore be expected to take different risks from 
those with weaker incentive alignment. To the extent that the bank exposures that performed poorly 
during the crisis were viewed as risky by CEOs in 2006, we would expect that bank CEOs with 
                                                 
4 See Bebchuck and Spamann (2009).   3
greater incentive alignment would have chosen to take fewer such exposures than CEOs with poor 
incentive alignment: CEOs with low holdings of shares would have had much less to lose in the 
event of bad outcomes as a result of these exposures. Further, CEOs with more options in their 
portfolio relative to shares would have been more willing to take risky exposures.  
We find that bank CEOs had substantial wealth invested in their banks. On average, the value 
of stock and options in the CEO’s portfolio was more than ten times the value of the CEO’s 
compensation in 2006. Consequently, changes in his bank’s stock price could easily wipe out all a 
CEO’s annual compensation. On average, CEOs owned 1.6% of the outstanding shares of their 
bank. Taking into account vested, but unexercised options, this fraction increases to 2.4%. The 
large holdings of vested unexercised options are striking. They are not consistent with the view that 
somehow the typical CEO knew that there was a substantial risk of a crash in the stock price of his 
bank.    
A bank’s stock return performance in 2007-2008 is negatively related to the dollar value of a 
CEO’s holdings of shares in 2006. This effect is substantial. An increase of one standard deviation 
in dollar ownership is associated with lower returns of 10.2%.  Similarly, a bank’s return on equity 
in 2008 is negatively related to its CEO’s holdings of shares in 2006 – a one standard deviation 
increase in dollar ownership is associated with approximately a 10.1% lower return on equity. This 
evidence is inconsistent with the view that CEOs took exposures that were not in the interests of 
shareholders. Rather, this evidence suggests that CEOs took exposures that they felt were profitable 
for  their  shareholders  ex  ante  but  that  these  exposures  performed  very  poorly  ex  post.  The 
convexity introduced by options does not appear to have had an adverse impact on accounting 
performance measured by ROE or by ROA.  ` 
An important issue with our approach is that CEOs could have sharply decreased their holdings 
after 2006 but before the full impact of the crisis, so that they did not have to bear the cost of the 
exposures they took. In that case, they would have appeared to have incentives aligned with those 
of the other shareholders in 2006, but they would have traded out of these incentives or would have   4
hedged them. Consequently, their behavior in 2006 might have been based on their knowledge that 
they would trade out of these incentives before the value of their portfolio fell substantially. For 
such  a  strategy  to  make  sense,  CEOs  would  have  had  to  be  able  to  anticipate  the  crisis.  We 
investigate the insider trading of bank CEOs in 2007-2008. We find no evidence that they traded 
out of their positions. CEOs therefore had to bear the losses associated with the poor outcomes of 
the exposures their banks had at the end of 2006. Our evidence on CEO trading of shares in 2007 
and 2008 is consistent with the hypothesis that the crisis and its evolution were unexpected for 
bank top executives. Some might argue that they should have known better, but our evidence also 
shows that they had stronger incentives than most to understand the distribution of the return of 
their stock and of the overall performance of their bank. 
There is a long literature on the compensation of bank CEOs. This literature shows that CEO 
compensation depends on stock return and accounting performance (Barro and Barro (1990)) as 
does the compensation of CEOs generally, but also that the composition of pay differs for bank 
CEOs from CEOs of other industries. In particular, the share of pay in the form of stock and 
options  for  bank  CEOs  is  lower  than  in  other  industries  (e.g.,  Adams  and  Mehran  (2003)  or 
Houston  and James  (1995)).  Several  papers  investigate the  impact of  deregulation  and  greater 
competition on bank CEO compensation. In particular, Hubbard and Palia (1995) and Crawford, 
Ezzell, and Miles (2003) conclude that deregulation led to greater pay-for-performance sensitivity 
of  CEO  pay  at  banks.  Further,  Crawford,  Ezzell,  and  Miles  (2003)  find  that,  following 
deregulation, pay-for-performance sensitivity of CEO pay increased more at less well-capitalized 
institutions.  They  interpret  this  result  as  evidence  of  a  moral  hazard  problem  induced  by  the 
existence of deposit insurance priced in a way that does not reflect the risks taken on by individual 
banks.  
More recently, a series of papers has analyzed whether bank CEO compensation is optimally 
designed to trade off two types of agency problems: the standard managerial agency problem as 
well as the risk-shifting problem between shareholders and debtholders that may be particularly   5
severe in highly leveraged institutions (e.g., John, Mehran and Qian (2008) and John and Qian 
(2003)). These papers also argue that leverage should reduce the pay-for-performance sensitivity of 
bank CEOs compared to other CEOs because of monitoring by debtholders. Accordingly, John and 
Quian (2003) show that bank CEOs have lower pay-for-performance sensitivity than other CEOs. 
This literature emphasizes that it may be optimal for shareholders to take more risks because doing 
so  increases  the  value  of  the  put  granted  to  banks  by  the  FDIC.  According  to  this  literature, 
aligning the incentives of CEOs better with those of shareholders may increase rather than decrease 
systemic risk. John, Saunders, and Senbet (2000) develop a model in which it is optimal for the 
FDIC to set insurance premiums taking into account the compensation contract of the bank’s CEO.    
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 1, we introduce our sample of banks. In Section 2, 
we present data on CEO compensation and equity ownership at the end of fiscal year 2006. We 
then turn to the relation between CEO compensation, equity ownership, and bank performance 
during the crisis in Section 3. In Section 4, we investigate the trading of CEOs in shares of their 
own bank after the end of 2006 and how their equity ownership evolves during the crisis. We 
conclude in Section 5. 
 
1.  The sample of banks 
 
Our  study  requires  compensation  data. This  data  is  available through  Standard  and  Poor’s 
Execucomp database. We use that database as the starting point for the formation of our sample.  
We download all firm-year observations for firms with SIC codes between 6000 and 6300 in fiscal 
year 2006. This yields 132 unique firms. We exclude firms with SIC codes 6282 (Investment 
Advice), because these are not in the lending business (e.g., Janus, T Rowe Price). In addition, we 
manually go through the list of firms in SIC codes 6199 (Finance Services) and SIC code 6211 
(Security  Brokers  and  Dealers).  Such  a  manual  search  is  necessary  because  SEC  code  6211   6
includes not  only  investment  banks  but  also  pure  brokerage  houses  such as Charles  Schwab.
5 
Further, SIC code 6199 contains both American Express and Citigroup. Though our sample has 
investment banks, we exclude pure brokerage houses and also report tests that exclude investment 
banks. For increased transparency, we show the firms we exclude from our analysis and those we 
include in Appendices A and B. Our final raw sample contains 98 firms. In addition, we obtain 
accounting data from Compustat, additional banking data from Compustat Bank, insider trading 
data from Thomson Financial, and stock return data from CRSP.    
Table 1 provides summary statistics of our sample of banks. It shows that we cover very large 
financial institutions. This is not surprising since Execucomp is biased towards larger firms. The 
median asset value is $15.5 billion, and the mean asset value is $129.3 billion. The sum of total 
assets of sample firms at the end-of-fiscal year 2006 is $12.3 trillion. At the end of 2006, the 
average (median) market capitalization of sample banks is $18.7 billion ($2.8 billion). The average 
net income over assets (over equity) is 1.2% (13.5%). We also report two measures of capital 
strength, the tier 1 capital ratio and the tangible common equity divided by tangible assets. The 
Tier 1 capital ratio is on average 9.7%, while the tangible common equity ratio is 6.7% at the end 
of fiscal year 2006. On average, the Tier 1 capital ratio makes these banks well capitalized. The 
lowest Tier 1 ratio is 5.73%, which is substantially above the regulatory minimum of 4%. No bank 
in our sample has negative net income in 2006.  
Our study examines the accounting and stock return performance of the sample banks until the 
end of 2008. Table 2 shows the attrition of sample firms from fiscal year end 2006 to the end of 
2008. Of the 95 banks with complete CEO compensation data in 2006, 77 survived until December 
2008. 12 banks were acquired, and 6 banks delisted from the exchange due to a violation of listing 
requirements or bankruptcy.  
 
                                                 
5 Using the finer North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) does not resolve the issues. For 
example, Goldman Sachs Group is classified as 523110 (Investment Banking & Brokerage) while Bear 
Stearns is classified as 523120 (Securities Brokerage).   7
2.  CEO compensation and equity ownership at the end of fiscal year 2006 
We  now  turn  to  an  examination  of  CEO’s  compensation  and  of  their  equity  and  option 
holdings at the end of 2006. Table 3 provides summary statistics on CEOs’ equity position and 
compensation.  The  Table  has  95  observations  because  three  firms  do  not  report  CEO  equity 
holdings for 2006 as a result of a change in CEO. Starting with fiscal year 2006, FASB 123(R) 
changed  the  way  executive  compensation  is  reported  in  proxy  statements.  For  example,  it 
introduced finer reporting requirements for deferred compensation, pension benefits, and details on 
all option series held by executives. The latter change greatly facilitates the calculation of the 
sensitivity of the executive’s option portfolio to volatility and stock price changes.  
The total  compensation  (including  new  option  and  stock  grants,  but  excluding  gains  from 
exercising options) of sample CEOs was on average $7.9 million, and the median compensation 
was $2.5 million. The majority of CEO compensation stems from performance-based pay, as the 
average base salary of $760,000 is less than 10% of the average total compensation. John and Qian 
(2003) use a sample constructed similarly to ours and investigate compensation for 120 commercial 
banks from 1992 to 2000. In that study, they find that the ratio of average salary to average total 
direct compensation is higher than what we find (16% versus 10%). Annual bonuses are paid both 
in cash for achievements of accounting based goals, and in equity to align incentives of CEOs and 
shareholders. More than 70% of all CEOs receive at least some of their 2006 compensation in 
equity. Conditional on at least receiving some compensation in equity, the fraction of equity pay is 
on average 48.5%. The dollar value of the annual equity grants is $4.3 million on average.  
As Hall and Liebman (1998) and Core and Guay (1999) point out, most CEO equity incentives 
stem from the existing portfolio of stock and options, and not from annual grants. A similar result 
holds for our sample. We define the total dollar value of equity of a CEO at the end of fiscal year 
2006 as the sum of unrestricted and restricted shares held multiplied by the end-of-year share price   8
plus  the  FASB  123R  fair  value  (where  available)
6  or  Black-Scholes  value  of  exercisable  and 
unexercisable  stock  options  plus  the  fair  value  of  unearned  equity  incentive  plans.  The  mean 
(median) value of the CEO’s equity stake is $88.1 million ($36.3 million). The average value of the 
overall equity portfolio is 20 times larger than the dollar value of annual grants of stocks and 
options ($2.6 million + $1.6 million) and more than ten times larger than the CEO’s total annual 
compensation. Perhaps surprisingly, much of the equity of the CEO is held voluntarily through 
unrestricted stock and vested, exercisable options.
7  There are 20 CEOs in our sample that have 
equity stakes valued at more than $100 million. The top 5 equity positions at the end of fiscal year 
2006 are held by Richard Fuld (Lehman Brothers, $1,003 million),  James Cayne (Bear Stearns, 
$953 million), Stan O’Neal (Merrill Lynch, $359 million), John Mack (Morgan Stanley, $320 
million), and Angelo Mozilo (Countrywide Financial, $285 million). On average, the shares owned 
by CEOs in our sample correspond to 1.6% of the shares of the company. In their sample, John and 
Qian (2003) found average equity holdings of 1.3% for their sample of commercial banks.  
We use the detailed option plan table to calculate the delta and vega of each option grant 
(current  and  past  grants).  To  calculate  delta  and  vega,  we  need  the  option’s  exercise  price, 
expiration date, volatility, the current stock price, the relevant interest rate, and the dividend yield. 
Option exercise price and expiration date come directly from Execucomp. We use the fiscal year-
end closing price of 2006 as the current stock price, the 3-year lagged volatility at the end of 2006 
as an estimate of the volatility, and the annual cash dividend for 2006 divided by the fiscal-year 
end closing price as an estimate of the dividend yield. The 10-year treasury rate is used as an 
estimate of the risk-free interest rate.   
                                                 
6 Fair values need to be reported according to FASB 123R, but the new format only became mandatory 
starting 12/31/2006, so that firms that have a fiscal year end not equal to December will report according to 
the old rules in our data. There are a total of 7 firms that do not report these values. For those firms, we use 
the aggregate values given for the exercisable and unexercisable options. 
7 Some companies may have established target stock ownership plans for their executives, so that the 
executive is not free to sell his or her entire stake (see, e.g., Core and Larcker (2002)).     9
Table 3 presents two measures of sensitivity of the equity portfolio of the CEO.  We show that 
the average (median) CEO has an ownership from shares and delta-weighted options of 2.4% 
(1.1%). In other words, the CEO’s wealth increases by $24 ($11) for every $1,000 in created 
shareholder wealth. The second measure is the dollar gain for a 1% increase in shareholder value. 
Table 3 shows that the average dollar gain is $1.1 million for a 1% change in firm value.  
We calculate the percentage change in the equity portfolio value of a CEO for a one percent 
increase in volatility using options only. We call this measure percentage equity risk sensitivity. 
Although common stock has some exposure to volatility (because it can be considered as a call 
option), Guay (1999) shows that for the typical firm, the volatility exposure of common stock is 
negligible. This result may not apply to banks because they are highly levered. Nevertheless, we 
use the traditional approach to estimate the equity risk sensitivity since its interpretation is well 
understood. It is possible that by proceeding this way we understate the equity risk sensitivity of 
CEOs. The average CEO in our sample stands to gain 0.5% of his total portfolio value if the stock 
price volatility increased by 1%. Alternatively, we can estimate the change in the dollar value of 
the CEO’s wealth for a 1% increase in stock price volatility. We call this measure the dollar equity 
risk sensitivity. In our sample, the average dollar equity risk sensitivity is $187,000. A risk-averse 
CEO would have to trade off the monetary value of an increase in volatility against its impact on 
the volatility of his wealth.  
 
3.  CEO incentives and bank performance during the crisis 
In this section, we investigate the relation between CEO incentives as of the end of fiscal year 
2006 and bank performance during the crisis. For the purpose of this paper, we consider the returns 
of banks from July 1, 2007, to December 31, 2008, to correspond to the returns of these banks 
during the crisis period. Admittedly, the crisis did not end in December 2008. Bank stocks lost 
substantial ground in the first quarter of 2009. However, during the period we consider the banking 
sector suffered losses not observed since the Great Depression. The subsequent losses were at least   10
partly affected by uncertainty about whether banks would be nationalized. Since it is not clear how 
the impact on bank stocks of the threat of nationalization would be affected by the incentives of 
CEOs before the crisis, it may well be that it is better to evaluate returns only until the end of 2008. 
There is a longstanding debate in the corporate finance literature on how to assess long-run 
performance (see Fama (1998) and Ritter and Loughran (2000)). One approach is to construct 
portfolios  and  evaluate  the  abnormal  performance  of  these  portfolios  from  the  intercept  of 
regressions of the returns of the portfolios on known risk factors. This approach has the advantage 
of evaluating performance in the context of a portfolio strategy. Another approach is to use buy-
and-hold returns. Using buy-and-hold returns is generally a better approach when attempting to 
explain the cross-sectional variation in performance when performance can be affected by many 
factors. In this paper, we use both approaches.  
Our  first  approach  to  estimate  the  relation  between  bank  stock  returns  and  bank  CEO 
incentives is to construct portfolios of banks that differ in CEO incentives and to compare the 
excess returns of these portfolios. We have four measures of incentives. The first two measures are 
percentage  ownership  and  dollar  ownership. The last  two  measures  are  percentage  equity  risk 
sensitivity and dollar equity risk sensitivity.  
We first construct portfolios of banks that, respectively, are in the top quartile and the bottom 
quartile of percentage ownership. In Panel A of Table 4, we report the mean weekly raw return and 
the median weekly raw return of a portfolio that is long the top quartile portfolio and short the 
bottom quartile portfolio. A negative return for the long-short portfolio means that the banks with 
CEOs who have the highest percentage ownership fared more poorly than the banks with CEOs 
who have the lowest percentage ownership. We find that the mean and median raw returns are 
insignificantly negative. The same result holds when we use dollar ownership instead of percentage 
ownership (row 2). Figure 1 plots the cumulative weekly raw returns of the portfolio that is long 
banks with CEOs in the top quartile of dollar ownership and short banks with CEOs in the bottom 
quartile of dollar ownership starting on July 1, 2007. The figure shows that the high ownership   11
portfolio underperforms the low ownership portfolio. While the effects are statistically insignificant 
in Table 4, Figure 1 is suggestive of economically large return differences. We also construct 
extreme quartile portfolios for percentage equity risk sensitivity and dollar equity risk sensitivity. 
The portfolio long the banks in the top quartile and short the banks in the bottom quartile of 
percentage equity risk sensitivity has a positive insignificant average and median return. In the case 
of dollar equity risk sensitivity, the mean and median returns are indistinguishable from zero.  
Panel B of Table 4 estimates the Fama and French (1993) model for each of the four portfolio 
strategies. This approach controls for factors known to affect returns of portfolios. The first row 
provides  results  for  the  high  minus  low  percentage  ownership  portfolio.  The  intercept  of  the 
regression (alpha) is -0.62% per week and statistically insignificant. In other words, a portfolio 
long the banks where the CEO has high equity incentives in the form of high share percentage 
ownership and short the banks where the CEO has low equity incentives underperforms, but not 
significantly so. We also estimated the same model starting on January 1, 2007. If we do that, the 
intercept is -0.0067 and is significant at the 10% level. The advantage of using the longer sample 
period is that the number of observations increases by a third, but at the cost that we include some 
months that precede the credit crisis to estimate the model more precisely. The regression for dollar 
ownership  is  presented  next.  With  that  regression,  the  intercept  is  again  negative  and  not 
significant. It is interesting to note that the percentage ownership portfolio strategy and the dollar 
ownership portfolio strategy have very different exposures to the risk factors. In the case of the 
percentage ownership portfolio strategy, the firms with high percentage ownership CEOs are less 
exposed to the market portfolio and more exposed to the SMB portfolio (which is the return of 
small firms minus the return of large firms). The opposite is true for the dollar ownership portfolio. 
This suggests that firms with high percentage equity ownership are smaller firms, whereas perhaps 
not surprisingly the firms with high dollar ownership are larger firms. We then turn to the equity 
risk  sensitivity  incentive  regressions.  With  the  regression  that  uses  percentage  equity  risk 
sensitivity, the intercept is positive and insignificant. This coefficient is positive and significant if   12
we estimate the model starting on January 1, 2007. The final regression uses the dollar equity risk 
sensitivity. For that regression, the intercept is also indistinguishable from zero. Again, the firms 
with more dollar equity risk sensitivity appear to be larger firms.  
Table 4 shows that there is no evidence that banks with higher CEO ownership performed 
better during the crisis and no evidence that banks where the risk incentives resulting from option 
holding were higher performed worse. With the longer sample period, there is evidence that banks 
with higher CEO ownership performed worse. The advantage of the approach used in that table is 
that  it  evaluates  returns  on  portfolios  that  investors  could  have  held.  However,  by  forming 
portfolios, we cannot use much information about individual banks. We now turn to tests that 
exploit more information about individual banks.  
We investigate the determinants of returns of individual banks using multiple regressions of 
buy-and-hold  returns  of  banks  from  July  1,  2007,  to  December  31,  2008,  on  various  bank 
characteristics.
8 The first four regressions respectively use each one of our incentive measures. Our 
other determinants of stock performance are the performance of the bank’s stock in 2006, the 
equity book-to-market ratio, and the log of the bank’s market value. Past returns, the book-to-
market ratio, and the log of market value are all variables known to be related to returns. However, 
here, these variables could affect performance for other reasons than for their role as risk factors 
that affect expected returns. For instance, it could be that larger banks were able to take more risks. 
A log transformation is applied to both the percentage ownership and the percentage vega. This 
transformation reduces the influence of extremely high values of these variables and makes the 
distribution closer to the normal distribution (e.g., Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Himmelberg, 
Hubbard,  and  Palia  (1999)).  We  winsorize  the  dollar  incentive  measures  at  the  2
nd  and  98
th 
percentile.  Regression  (1)  uses  the  logarithm  of  dollar  ownership.  The  coefficient  on  dollar 
ownership is significantly negative. The coefficient on percentage ownership in regression (2) is 
                                                 
8 Proceeds from banks that delist or merge prior to December 2008 are put in a cash account until December 
2008. Results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar if proceeds are put in an industry index.   13
negative  as  well  but  not  significant.  We  also  estimated  this  regression  without  the  log 
transformation, in which case the coefficient on percentage ownership is negative and marginally 
significant. However, the significance is driven by a few large values and disappears when we 
winsorize percentage ownership at the 5% level. We then turn to equity risk incentives. Regression 
(3) uses the dollar measure. The coefficient is negative and insignificant. In regression (4), the 
coefficient on the percentage measure is positive and significant.  
In regressions (5) and (6), we use respectively dollar and percentage incentive measures and 
control for other determinants of performance measured as of the end of 2006. In regression (5), 
the  dollar  share  ownership  has  a  negative  significant  coefficient.  This  effect  is  economically 
significant.  The  standard  deviation  of  the  logarithm  of  dollar  equity  incentives  is  1.6. 
Consequently, an increase of one standard deviation in dollar ownership is associated with lower 
returns of 10.2% (0.064 x 1.6).  Also, a bank’s return during the crisis is negatively related to the 
bank’s stock return performance in 2006, although the result is not statistically significant. Beltratti 
and  Stulz  (2009)  also  find  this  result  –  but  with  statistical  significance  -  for  a  sample  of 
international banks. This result suggests that banks that took on more exposures that the market 
approved of in 2006 suffered more during the crisis. We find next that banks with a higher book-to-
market ratio in 2006 have worse performance during the crisis. A possible explanation for this 
result is that banks with less franchise value took more risks that worked out poorly during the 
crisis. Large banks perform worse. Turning to regression (6), percentage ownership has a negative 
insignificant coefficient and percentage equity risk incentive has a positive significant coefficient. 
The  coefficients  on  the  other  explanatory  variables  are  similar  to  those  of  regression  (5). 
Regressions (7) and (8) require information on the Tier 1 capital ratio of banks. This requirement 
removes from the sample all non-depository banks. In particular, all large investment banks drop 
out of the sample. The coefficients on the incentive variables of CEOs are largely the same. It 
follows therefore that our results cannot be explained by the large share ownership of some CEOs 
of investment banks that performed poorly.    14
The  results  of  Table  5  are  robust  when  we  change  the  sample  period  or  variables.  In 
regressions not reproduced here, we use tangible common equity to assets as a measure of the 
capital ratio and obtain similar results. We also find similar results if we use returns from January 
1, 2007, to December 31, 2008, or if we use only 2008. The same results hold if we do not 
winsorize dollar incentives or if we truncate dollar incentives.  
So far, we have focused on bank performance measured by equity returns. We now turn to the 
performance of banks using two measures of accounting performance: Return on assets (ROA) and 
return on equity (ROE). In Figure 2, we show the evolution of quarterly ROA from 2005Q4 to 
2008Q3. Not surprisingly, the average ROA plummets in 2008. For our regression analysis, return 
on assets is defined as the cumulative quarterly net income from 2007Q3 to 2008Q3 divided by 
total assets at the end of 2007Q2. For return on equity, we divide the cumulative quarterly net 
income by the book value of equity at the end of 2007Q2. In the regressions we report in Table 6, 
we use the same control variables as those used in Table 5. Regressions (1) through (4) use ROA as 
the dependent variable. The first two regressions use all banks; the last two regressions require 
availability of the Tier 1 capital ratio. In the sample of all banks, neither the CEO’s dollar incentive 
measure nor his percentage ownership measure has a significant coefficient. With the equity risk 
sensitivity  measure,  neither  the  dollar  measure  nor  the  percentage  measure  is  significant.  In 
regressions (3) and (4), the only change for the CEO incentive measures is that the CEO’s dollar 
incentive measure has a significant negative coefficient. The only other explanatory variable that is 
significant in the regressions is the book-to-market ratio. Turning to the four ROE regressions, we 
see  that  the  CEO’s  dollar  incentive  measure  has  a  negative  significant  coefficient  in  both 
regressions.  In  regression  (7),  which  uses  a  sample  of  depository  banks  only,  the  percentage 
ownership measure has a negative significant coefficient. The percentage risk sensitivity measure is 
significant in regression (5) but, although the coefficient is similar, it is not in regression (7) that 
uses a smaller sample. The dollar risk sensitivity measure is significant in the larger sample, but not   15
in the smaller one. In addition to book-to-market, the lagged return is now significant in regressions 
(5) and (6).   
We estimate other regressions using ROA and ROE that we do not reproduce in a table. First, 
we  estimate  regressions  where  the  additional  explanatory  variables  besides  the  CEO  incentive 
measures are the log of the bank’s market value at the end of 2006, the volatility of its stock return 
in the three previous years, and the Tier I capital ratio. We find that the coefficient on dollar equity 
incentives  is  negative  and  significant  in  the  ROE  regression.  The  coefficient  on  volatility  is 
negative and significant. We also estimate these regressions on changes in ROA and changes in 
ROE. The dollar equity incentive has a significant negative coefficient and the dollar equity risk 
sensitivity measure has a positive significant coefficient.  
 
4.  CEO equity losses during the crisis 
We have uncovered no evidence supportive of the view that better alignment of incentives 
between  CEOs  and  shareholders  would  have  led  to  better  bank  performance  or  that  option 
compensation is to blame for the poor performance of banks. Our evidence is consistent with the 
hypothesis that CEOs who took exposures that performed poorly during the crisis did so because 
they thought that doing so was good for shareholders as well as for themselves. Our evidence 
provides  no  support  for  the  hypothesis  that  option  compensation  led  CEOs  to  take  on  more 
exposures that performed poorly during the crisis. Finally, our evidence is consistent with the 
hypothesis that CEOs did not expect these exposures to work out poorly.  
So far, however, we proceeded with our analysis using CEO share and option holdings at the 
end of 2006. If CEOs saw the crisis coming some time after the end of 2006, they could have sold 
their holdings and hence would not have been affected adversely by their decisions. We investigate 
in this section how share ownership of CEOs evolved during the crisis. For this analysis, we use 
Execucomp and the database on insider transactions from Thomsom Financial. We aggregate CEO   16
transactions by firm and quarter. We are able to match 88 of the 95 bank CEOs in Execucomp to 
the Thomson Financial database.  
Figure 3 reports the quarterly mean and median of CEO net share purchases between 2007Q1 
and 2008Q4. Throughout the period, on average, CEOs sell less than 2% of their holdings per 
quarter. The exception is for the quarter ending in September 2008, when they sell almost 4% of 
their holdings on average. It is common for executives to sell shares because their portfolio tends to 
become less diversified as they exercise options and receive stock grants. Figure 3 also shows the 
increase in ownership of CEOs through new grants of options and stock. They receive grants 
throughout the period.  
In  Table  7,  we  attempt  to  estimate  the  dollar  loss  of  CEOs  in  our  sample  on  their  stock 
holdings resulting from the fall in the value of their holdings over the period from the end of fiscal 
year 2006 through December 31, 2008. Our starting point for each CEO is the shares held at the 
end of 2006. We then use the insider trading data to evaluate the price at which the CEO sold 
shares if he sold shares. The CEO’s loss is then defined as the loss in value of the shares not sold, 
evaluated using the price of the shares at the end of December 2008 or when the CEO loses his job 
plus the loss made on shares sold, measured as the difference between the value of shares at the end 
of 2006 and the price of the shares sold. The average value of shares held at the end of 2006 is 
$61.503 million. On average, a CEO lost $28.771 million on the shares not sold and $2.719 million 
on the shares sold. More than three quarters of the CEOs did not report any insider sales. On 
average, a CEO lost $31.490 million. The median loss is sharply less, however, at $5.084 million. 
It follows from Table 7 that CEOs made large losses on their wealth during the crisis and that most 
of these losses come from holding on to their shares. Had CEOs seen the crisis coming, they could 
have avoided most of these losses by selling their shares.  They clearly did not do so.  
We also investigate what happened to the options held by CEOs. Strikingly, only 12% of the 
options  granted  before  2007  were  out  of  the  money  at  fiscal  year  end  2006.  In  contrast,   17
approximately 70% of all options granted before 2007 were out of the money at the end of the 
sample period. Consequently, CEOs suffered large losses on their options as well.        
A valid concern is whether we overestimate the equity losses of insiders. We could be missing 
hedging activities by insiders that are carried out through off-market equity transactions such as 
zero-cost  equity  collars,  exchange  funds,  or  variable  prepaid  forward  contracts.
9  All  these 
transactions have in common that the insider does not sell the shares and thus retains the voting 
rights of the stock while receiving significant downside protection.  
It is important to note that the SEC has mandated reporting of such hedging transactions since 
1996. Thomson Financial, our data provider for insider transactions, has specific fields that capture 
trading of prepaid variable forward contracts, exchange funds, and equity swaps. When we search 
for  zero-cost  collars,  exchange  funds,  and  prepaid  variable  forward  contracts  by  the  CEOs  of 
sample banks, we do not find a single hedging transaction. When we expand the search to all bank 
insiders between January 2007 and December 2008, we find less than 10 transactions, mostly 
prepaid variable forward contracts by non-executive directors.  
The lack of reported hedging activities is not surprising in light of the sample sizes of two 
comprehensive studies on off-market equity transactions. Bettis, Bizjak, and Lemmon (2001) study 
all filings by all insiders between January 1996 and December 1998 and are only able to identify 85 
zero-cost  collars.  Jagolinzer,  Matsunaga,  and  Yeung  (2007)  examine  prepaid  variable  forward 
transactions and are able to find only 174 contracts from the universe of filings between August 
1996 and June 2004, with roughly a third of them carried out by CEOs. 
While there is some debate on the issue of whether insiders underreport hedging transactions, it 
is argued by most legal experts that not reporting hedging transactions is illegal (see the discussion 
in Smith and Eisinger (2004)). Overall, we have no reason to believe that significant hedging 
activities attenuate the finding of large equity losses documented in Table 7.  
 
                                                 
9 The use of equity swaps disappeared in the mid-nineties because of their disadvantageous tax treatment.   18
5.  Conclusion 
Bank CEO incentives cannot be blamed for the credit crisis or for the performance of banks 
during that crisis. Whether we look at depository banks only or at a larger sample that includes 
investment banks as well, there is no evidence that banks with CEOs whose incentives were less 
well aligned with the interests of their shareholders performed worse during the crisis. When we 
attempt to explain the performance of banks in the cross-section, we find evidence that banks 
where CEOs had better incentives in terms of the dollar value of their stake in their bank performed 
significantly worse than banks where CEOs had poorer incentives. Stock options had no adverse 
impact on bank performance during the crisis.  
A  possible  explanation  for  our  results  is  that  CEOs  with  better  incentives  to  maximize 
shareholder wealth took risks that other CEOs did not. Ex ante, these risks looked profitable for 
shareholders. Ex post, these risks had unexpected poor outcomes. These poor outcomes are not 
evidence of CEOs acting in their own interest at the expense of shareholder wealth.  
Support  for  this  possible  explanation  is  provided  by  our  examination  of  the  wealth 
consequences of the crisis for bank CEOs. If CEOs took risks that they knew were not in the 
interests of their shareholders, we would expect them to have sold shares ahead of the crisis. We 
find that this did not happen. In fact, CEO holdings of shares on net increased. Not surprisingly, 
CEOs therefore made large losses on their holdings of shares and on their holdings of options. On 
average, CEOs in our sample lost at least $30 million and the median CEO loss is more than $5 
million.  
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Appendix A: List of excluded financial firms in SIC codes 6000 – 6300 
We download all firms that are in Standard and Poor’s Execucomp database in 2006 and have an 
SIC code between 6000 and 6300. From this list, we exclude the following firms because they are 
mostly concerned with investment advice, pure brokerage business, or wire transfering and do not 
match well our definition of a lending institution:  
 
  A G Edwards 
  Affiliated Managers Group Inc. 
  American Express 
  Americredit Corp 
  Bankrate Inc. 
  Bisys Group 
  Capital One Financial 
  Charles Schwab   
  CIT Group 
  CME Group 
  Eaton Vance Corporation  
  E-Trade Financial Group 
  Federated Investors Inc.  
  Financial Federal Corporation 
  Finova Group 
  Franklin Resources Inc 
  Intercontinental Exchange  
  Investment Technology Group 
  Janus Capital Group Inc 
  LaBranche & Co 
  Legg Mason Inc 
  Mellon Financial Corp 
  Metavante Technologies 
  Moneygram International  
  Nuveen Investments 
  Price (T Rowe) Group 
  Raymond James Financial   
  SEI Investments Company 
  Southwest Securities Group (SWS Group) 
  State Street Corporation 
  TD Ameritrade Holding 
  Tradestation group 
  Waddell&Reed   
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Appendix B: Final Sample firms 
1  ANCHOR BANCORP INC/WI  50  INVESTORS FINANCIAL SVCS CP 
2  ASSOCIATED BANC-CORP  51  IRWIN FINANCIAL CORP 
3  ASTORIA FINANCIAL CORP  52  JEFFERIES GROUP INC 
4  BANK MUTUAL CORP  53  JPMORGAN CHASE & CO 
5  BANK OF AMERICA CORP  54  KEYCORP 
6  BANK OF HAWAII CORP  55  LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS INC 
7  BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON CORP  56  M & T BANK CORP 
8  BB&T CORP  57  MAF BANCORP INC 
9  BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC  58  MARSHALL & ILSLEY CORP 
10  BOSTON PRIVATE FINL HOLDINGS  59  MERCANTILE BANKSHARES CORP 
11  BROOKLINE BANCORP INC  60  MERRILL LYNCH & CO INC 
12  CASCADE BANCORP  61  MORGAN STANLEY 
13  CATHAY GENERAL BANCORP  62  NATIONAL CITY CORP 
14  CENTRAL PACIFIC FINANCIAL CP  63  NEW YORK CMNTY BANCORP INC 
15  CHITTENDEN CORP  64  NORTHERN TRUST CORP 
16  CITIGROUP INC  65  PNC FINANCIAL SVCS GROUP INC 
17  CITY NATIONAL CORP  66  POPULAR INC 
18  COLONIAL BANCGROUP  67  PROSPERITY BANCSHARES INC 
19  COMERICA INC  68  PROVIDENT BANKSHARES CORP 
20  COMMERCE BANCORP INC/NJ  69  REGIONS FINANCIAL CORP 
21  COMPASS BANCSHARES INC  70  SLM CORP 
22  CORUS BANKSHARES INC  71  SOUTH FINANCIAL GROUP INC 
23  COUNTRYWIDE FINANCIAL CORP  72  SOVEREIGN BANCORP INC 
24  CULLEN/FROST BANKERS INC  73  STERLING BANCORP/NY 
25  DIME COMMUNITY BANCSHARES  74  STERLING BANCSHRS/TX 
26  DOWNEY FINANCIAL CORP  75  STERLING FINANCIAL CORP/WA 
27  EAST WEST BANCORP INC  76  SUNTRUST BANKS INC 
28  FANNIE MAE  77  SUSQUEHANNA BANCSHARES INC 
29  FIFTH THIRD BANCORP  78  SVB FINANCIAL GROUP 
30  FIRST BANCORP P R  79  SYNOVUS FINANCIAL CORP 
31  FIRST COMMONWLTH FINL CP/PA  80  TCF FINANCIAL CORP 
32  FIRST FINL BANCORP INC/OH  81  TD BANKNORTH INC 
33  FIRST HORIZON NATIONAL CORP  82  TRUSTCO BANK CORP/NY 
34  FIRST INDIANA CORP  83  U S BANCORP 
35  FIRST MIDWEST BANCORP INC  84  UCBH HOLDINGS INC 
36  FIRST NIAGARA FINANCIAL GRP  85  UMPQUA HOLDINGS CORP 
37  FIRSTFED FINANCIAL CORP/CA  86  UNIONBANCAL CORP 
38  FIRSTMERIT CORP  87  UNITED BANKSHARES INC/WV 
39  FLAGSTAR BANCORP INC  88  UNITED COMMUNITY BANKS INC 
40  FRANKLIN BANK CORP  89  WACHOVIA CORP 
41  FREMONT GENERAL CORP  90  WASHINGTON FED INC 
42  GLACIER BANCORP INC  91  WASHINGTON MUTUAL INC 
43  GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP INC  92  WEBSTER FINANCIAL CORP 
44  GREATER BAY BANCORP  93  WELLS FARGO & CO 
45  HANMI FINANCIAL CORP  94  WESTAMERICA BANCORPORATION 
46  HUDSON CITY BANCORP INC  95  WILMINGTON TRUST CORP 
47  HUNTINGTON BANCSHARES  96  WILSHIRE BANCORP INC 
48  INDEPENDENT BANK CORP/MI  97  WINTRUST FINANCIAL CORP 
49  INDYMAC BANCORP INC  98  ZIONS BANCORPORATION   23
Table 1: Sample summary statistics for calendar year 2006 
The table shows summary statistics for key variables for a sample of 95 bank holding 
companies and investment banks for fiscal year 2006. Sample selection criteria are 
described in Section 2. The list of sample banks is provided in Appendix B. The data are 
from the Compustat annual and Compustat Bank annual databases. Tier 1 capital ratio is 
calculated according to the Basle Accord for reporting risk-adjusted capital adequacy and 
is taken from the Compustat Bank database. The tangible common equity ratio is defined 
as tangible common equity divided by total assets less intangible assets (including 
goodwill). Those data are provided by the Compustat annual database.  
 
 
      Lower    Upper       
   N  Minimum  Quartile  Median  Quartile  Maximum  Mean  Std Dev 
Total assets  95  2008.5  6717.6  15497.2  60712.2  1459737.0  129307.2  303878.5 
Total liabilities  95  1788.8  6083.5  14685.0  56768.3  1324465.0  119265.6  280902.5 
Market capitalization  94  366.5  1222.5  2788.4  13273.0  273598.1  18725.5  44489.8 
Net income / total assets  95  0.03%  0.84%  1.16%  1.45%  2.55%  1.17%  0.47% 
Net income / book equity  95  0.33%  10.42%  13.01%  16.63%  29.18%  13.46%  5.67% 
Cash / total assets  95  0.38%  1.63%  2.26%  2.79%  6.47%  2.35%  1.20% 
Dividend per share  95  0.00  0.45  0.88  1.30  2.32  0.93  0.58 
Book-to-market ratio  94  0.27  0.43  0.50  0.64  0.87  0.53  0.15 
Tier 1 capital ratio  83  5.73%  8.43%  9.42%  11.09%  19.04%  9.70%  2.00% 
Tangible common equity 
ratio  83  1.63%  5.32%  6.36%  7.40%  22.91%  6.69%  2.73% 
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Table 2: Attrition of banks included in sample 
The sample includes 95 commercial and investment banks covered by Execucomp in fiscal 
year 2006. Remaining in sample signifies that the bank is still listed on a major U.S. 
exchange in December 2008. Merged or acquired signifies that the bank left the sample 
due to an acquisition or merger during the sample period, and Delisted by exchange 
signifies a delisting of the bank due to a violation of listing requirements or bankruptcy.  
 
Event  Number of Obs.  Frequency [%] 
Remaining in sample  77  81.1 
Merged or acquired  12  12.6 
Delisted by exchange  6  6.3 
   25
Table 3: CEO compensation and equity ownership at the end of fiscal year 2006 
The  table  shows  summary  statistics  for  key  compensation  variables  for  a  sample  of  95  bank 
holding companies and investment banks for fiscal year 2006. The data are from the Compustat 
Execucomp database. Values are reported in thousands of dollars. Most of the variables of the table 
are directly taken from Execucomp. The percentage change in portfolio value for a 1% increase in 
volatility is calculated using the detailed information on all current and previous option grants 
mandated by FASB 123R. Percentage ownership from shares and exercisable options is from the 
proxy statement and counts exercisable options and options that become exercisable within 60 days 
after the record date as the equivalent of 1 share. Percentage ownership from shares and all options 
(delta-weighted) uses the detailed information on current and previous option grants to calculate 
the  options’  delta and  multiplies the  number  of  options  held in  each series  by  its  delta  when 
calculating the percentage ownership.  
 
    Lower    Upper     
CEO annual compensation  N  Quartile  Median  Quartile  Mean  std dev 
Total Compensation  95  1218.8  2503.8  7448.5  7874.2  11513.0 
Salary  95  566.3  750.0  978.5  764.1  344.8 
Zero equity pay in total compensation  95        28.4%   
Fraction of total comp paid in equity  68  35.8%  47.5%  64.1%  48.5%  19.9% 
Dollar value of annual option grant  95  0  205.9  1687.5  1624.3  3500.8 
Dollar value of annual stock grant  95  0  314.3  2009.0  2680.6  6086.5 
             
CEO deferred compensation and pensions             
Aggregate Balance of deferred compensation   91  0.0  714.0  5000.4  7351.4  23626.5 
Present value of all pension promises  91  97.6  2221.5  6653.0  5497.3  8420.5 
Total debt CEO - firm  91  970.4  4253.4  11748.0  12848.6  26597.5 
             
CEO equity portfolio - value             
Value of equity stake  95  5046.5  22928.5  57548.3  57226.2  111345.
8 
Value of exercisable options  95  1452.2  5024.2  19456.6  16622.0  30910.1 
Value of unexercisable options  95  0.0  234.6  1533.0  1728.9  3907.4 
Value of unvested restricted stock  95  0.0  242.1  3139.2  10782.8  55860.0 
Value of stock and options in CEO portfolio  95  10363.3  36360.6  85039.9  88123.8  156104.
8 
             
CEO equity portfolio - incentives             
Percentage ownership from shares  95  0.2%  0.4%  1.2%  1.6%  4.3% 
Percentage ownership from shares and all 
options (delta-weighted) 
95  0.5%  1.1%  2.4%  2.4%  4.7% 
Dollar change in portfolio value for 1% change 
in firm value 
94  169.3  501.8  1376.2  1134.6  1586.6 
             
CEO exposure to equity risk              
Percentage change in portfolio value for a 1% 
increase in volatility 
94  0.06%  0.25%  0.59%  0.46%  1.01% 
Dollar change in portfolio value for a 1% 
increase in volatility 
94  20.1  59.5  211.8  187.7  287.9   26
Table 4: Returns to equal-weighted high and low ownership and equity risk portfolios  
Panel A of the table shows the average and median weekly return of a portfolio of high CEO 
ownership (high CEO equity risk) firms minus low CEO ownership (low CEO equity risk) firms. 
Firms are classified as high ownership (high equity risk) if the ownership (equity risk) of the CEO 
at the end of fiscal year 2006 is in the top quartile of all CEOs. Low ownership (low equity risk) is 
defined accordingly. The table reports results for a percentage ownership measure, which is equal 
to the number of shares and all options (delta-weighted) held by the CEO divided by the total 
number of shares outstanding as well as a dollar ownership measure, which is equal to the dollar 
change in the executive’s portfolio for a 1% change in the stock price.  Percentage equity risk is 
equal to the percentage change in the executive’s equity portfolio value for a 1% change in 
volatility. Dollar equity risk is equal to the dollar change in the executive’s portfolio value for a 1% 
change in volatility. In Panel A, p- and z-values of tests of statistical differences from zero are 
reported in parenthesis. Panel B reports estimates from a regression based on a three- factor 
performance attribution model for the weekly return difference of a high ownership (equity risk) 
minus low ownership (equity risk) portfolio. The panel reports equal-weighted weekly return 
regressions. The three factors are defined in Fama and French (1993). The factors are the returns to 
zero-investment portfolios designed to capture market (RMRF), size (SMB), and book-to-market 
(HML) effects, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Weekly returns of high minus low CEO ownership/equity risk portfolios 
  Mean  p-value  Median  z-value 
High  minus  low 
% ownership 
-0.0041  (0.40)  -0.0023  (0.37) 
High minus low $ 
ownership 
-0.0052  (0.28)  -0.0037  (0.19) 
High  minus  low 
% equity risk 
0.0038  (0.34)  0.0065  (0.17) 
High minus low $ 
equity risk 
-0.0014  (0.75)  -0.0001  (0.95) 
 
Panel B: Weekly Fama-French performance attribution regressions (Jul 2007-Dec 2008) 
  Alpha  RMRF  SMB  HML 




















High  minus  low 
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Table 5: Buy-and-hold returns and CEO ownership and equity risk exposure 
The Table shows results from a cross-sectional regression of buy-and-hold returns for banks from July 2007 – December 2008 on CEO 
equity ownership and firm characteristics measured at the end of fiscal year 2006. CEO equity ownership (dollar incentives) is the dollar 
change in the value of the CEO’s equity portfolio for a 1% change in the stock price. CEO ownership (%) is the sum of all shares (restricted 
and unrestricted) and delta-weighted options (exercisable and unexercisable) held by the CEO divided by the total number of shares 
outstanding multiplied by 100. CEO $ equity risk is defined as the dollar change in portfolio value for a 1% increase in volatility. CEO % 
equity risk is defined as the percentage change in portfolio value for a 1% increase in volatility and is calculated from all option series held 
by the CEO. A log transformation is applied to both the percentage ownership and percentage equity risk. The firm characteristics are 
measured at the end of year 2006. These characteristics include the stock return in 2006, the book-to-market ratio, the natural logarithm of 
the market capitalization, and the tier 1 capital ratio. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 




(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
CEO $ ownership  -0.069*** 
(0.025) 
      -0.064* 
(0.034) 
  -0.067* 
(0.037) 
 
CEO % ownership     -0.005 
(0.030) 
      -0.035 
(0.033) 
  -0.030 
(0.033) 
CEO $ equity risk      -0.005 
(0.018) 
  0.030 
(0.021) 
  0.040 
(0.025) 
 
CEO % equity risk        0.037** 
(0.019) 
  0.024 
(0.019) 
  0.028 
(0.022) 
























Tier 1 capital ratio 
 




Number of observations  94  94  93  93  89  89  78  78 
Adjusted R2  0.069  0.017  0.001  0.030  0.25  0.25  0.30  0.29 
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Table 6: ROA and ROE regressions  
The Table shows regressions of the return on assets and return on equity on CEO ownership, CEO equity risk exposure, and control 
variables. Return on assets is defined as the cumulative quarterly net income from 2007Q3 to 2008Q3 divided by the total assets at the end 
of 2007Q2. Return on equity is defined as the cumulative quarterly net income from 2007Q3 to 2008Q3 divided by the book value of 
common equity at the end of 2007Q2. CEO % ownership is the sum of all shares (restricted and unrestricted) and delta-weighted options 
(exercisable  and  unexercisable)  held  by  the  CEO  divided  by  the  total  number  of  shares  outstanding  multiplied  by  100.  CEO  dollar 
ownership is the dollar change in the value of the CEO’s equity portfolio for a 1% change in the stock price. CEO % equity risk is defined 
as the percentage change in portfolio value for a 1% increase in volatility and is calculated from all option series held by the CEO. CEO 
dollar equity risk is defined as the dollar change in portfolio value for a 1% increase in volatility. A log transformation is applied to both the 
percentage ownership and percentage equity risk.  Columns 1 through 4 show results for return on assets regressions, and columns 5 
through  8  show  corresponding  results  for  the  return  on  equity.  The  control  variables  include  the  natural  logarithm  of  the  market 
capitalization, the tier 1 capital ratio, and the book-to-market ratio, all measured at the end of fiscal year 2006.  Lagged return is the lagged 
return on assets for columns 1 through 4 and the lagged return on equity for columns 5 through 8. It is measured over the five previous 
quarters to be consistent.  Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is indicated by 
***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
  ROA  ROE 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
CEO % ownership  -0.002    -0.003    -0.037    -0.043*   
  (0.002)    (0.002)    (0.026)    (0.025)   
CEO % equity risk  0.002    0.002    0.024*    0.020   
  (0.001)    (0.002)    (0.014)    (0.016)   
CEO $ ownership    -0.003    -0.005*    -0.064**    -0.067** 
    (0.003)    (0.003)    (0.027)    (0.029) 
CEO $ equity risk    0.002    0.002    0.027*    0.025 
    (0.001)    (0.002)    (0.016)    (0.018) 
Lagged return  -0.187  -0.184  -0.478  -0.452  -0.593**  -0.594**  -0.420  -0.400 
  (0.232)  (0.232)  (0.495)  (0.495)  (0.240)  (0.240)  (0.434)  (0.436) 
Book-to-market  -0.059***  -0.060***  -0.074***  -0.075***  -0.827***  -0.838***  -0.879***  -0.883*** 
  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.225)  (0.225)  (0.226)  (0.226) 
Log (market value)  -0.002  -0.000  0.001  0.004  -0.021  0.016  0.007  0.050* 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.020)  (0.024)  (0.022)  (0.026) 
Tier 1 capital ratio      0.002  0.002      0.024  0.023 
      (0.002)  (0.002)      (0.017)  (0.017) 
Observations  85  85  74  74  84  84  74  74 
R-squared  0.14  0.14  0.24  0.24  0.23  0.23  0.31  0.31  
 
Table 7: Dollar Loss of CEOs’ equity portfolios during the credit crisis 
The table shows the cumulative trading losses and the losses from shares held from the 
beginning to the end of the sample period. The sample contains 80 bank CEOs. A CEO 
who turned over prior to September 2007 is excluded from the sample. Cumulative trading 
losses are calculated as shares sold multiplied with the difference of the price at the fiscal 
year end 2006 and the transaction price. Only insider sales unrelated to option exercises are 
included in the calculations. The ‘loss from not acting’ is calculated as the shares held at 
the end of the sample period multiplied with the difference of the fiscal year end price 
2006 and the stock price at the end of the sample period. End of the sample period is 
defined as either December 2008, the month of the turnover of the CEO, or the month of 
the  corporate  event  (merger,  delisting),  whichever  comes  earlier.  The  ‘total  loss’  is 
calculated  as  the  sum  of  the  cumulative  trading  loss  and  the  loss  from  not  acting.  If 
Thomson Financial does not report a sale of shares unrelated to options, it is assumed that 
the CEO did not sell any of his shares, and cumulative trading losses are set to zero. All 
numbers, except for stock prices, are reported in thousands of dollars.  
 
 
  Mean  Maximum  Q3  Median  Q1  Minimum 
Stock price end of fiscal 
year 2006 
40.36  11.12  23.95  35.58  48.75  152.48 
Stock price end of sample 
period 
21.91  0.10  7.98  14.72  32.38  89.65 
Total value of shares held 
end of fiscal year 2006 
61503.82  347.48  7065.16  23628.25  57337.03  894128.54 
Loss from not acting 
 
28771.49  368429.27  19150.44  5076.10  784.05  -13628.19 
Cumulative trading loss 
 
2719.45  201538.71  56.63  0.00  0.00  -686.16 
Total dollar loss  31490.94  368429.27  20315.48  5084.30  916.83  -13628.19 
 
   30
Figure 1: Cumulative weekly portfolio returns July 2007 – December 2008  
 
The figure shows cumulative weekly portfolio returns for a portfolio of high CEO 
ownership financial firms, for a portfolio of low CEO ownership banks, and for a long-
short portfolio where the high CEO ownership banks are bought.  Firms are classified as 
high ownership if the ownership of the CEO at the end of fiscal year 2006 is in the top 
quartile of all sample CEOs. Ownership is a dollar ownership measure, which is equal to 
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Figure 2: Evolution of net income over assets 2006Q1 – 2008Q3 
The figure plots the evolution of average and median net income / total assets of a sample 
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Figure 3: CEO insider trading  
The figure shows the average total percentage changes in CEO ownership and ownership 
changes caused by trading and new grants. The sample contains 80 bank CEOs that are 
covered by both Execucomp and Thomson Financial’s insider trading database. A CEO 
who turned over prior to September 2007 is excluded from the sample. For each CEO, all 
insider transactions reported by Thomson Financial are aggregated by firm and quarter. If a 
CEO does not trade or does not receive new grants, he is not included in the cross-sectional 
average for a given quarter. The percentage change in ownership is defined as the number 
of shares (or derivatives) traded divided by the total CEO ownership from stocks and 









































Ownership changes through insider trading
Ownership changes through new grants
Total CEO ownership changes
 